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The philosophy of law, or jurisprudence, is an area of study wherein 
experimental methods are largely absent but sorely needed. It is puzzling 
that the experimental turn has been slow in coming to jurisprudence, as 
the field straddles two disciplines where empirical evidence is increas-
ingly common. On one flank, empirical studies have long been popular 
among non-philosophers in law departments; on the other, experimental 
methods now abound in many areas of philosophy.
While it is difficult to understand why few have adopted an experi-
mental approach to jurisprudence, it is clear why experimental jurispru-
dence should be on the agenda: legal philosophers routinely ask questions 
that are explicitly empirical. To give just one brief example, consider the 
fact that in contemporary jurisprudence, some philosophers are con-
cerned, in part, to give the correct account of our concept of law or our 
concept of a legal system (Raz, 2009), while others are anxious to show 
that there is no single concept of law (L. Murphy, 2005; Priel, 2013). It 
would seem that this empirical debate—about whether we have a shared 
concept of law at all, and if so, what contours that concept has—would 
benefit from empirical research. In particular, we might seek out folk 
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psychological evidence, predicated on the positive impact such evidence 
has had in other domains of philosophy.
The foregoing may not be convincing. Traditional legal philosophers 
who do not use empirical methods will need to hear more to appreciate 
why strange, new techniques might be appropriate. Experimental 
philosop hers who have yet to consider jurisprudence will need to hear 
more about the subfield and its issues to understand how they might con-
tribute. We hope to address such philosophers and others, but not with a 
purely metaphilosophical tract. Instead, our chapter aims to exemplify the 
potential for experimental approaches to jurisprudence. As such, we 
focus on a narrow issue in jurisprudence. We appraise Lon Fuller’s pro-
cedural natural law theory using experimental techniques. Admittedly, 
his is just one of many theories about law; however, it is a prominent 
theory, and legal philosophers have written extensively to criticize (Hart, 
1965; D’Amato, 1981), defend (C. Murphy, 2005), and extend that theory 
(Winston, 2005). If our experiments usefully add to this debate, we hope 
to thereby have illustrated the legitimacy and value of experimental 
jurisprudence.
The trajectory of the chapter is as follows. We begin with background 
on Fuller’s theory of law and on the state of jurisprudence. For those 
well-versed in those debates, this can be skimmed or skipped. Next, we 
offer an overview of the studies that we performed. In this overview sec-
tion, we state with precision how our experimental approach helps to 
assess Fuller’s theory. After the overview, we present each of the three 
studies themselves. For each study, we discuss our predictions, the 
motivating thoughts behind those predictions, the manner by which the 
experiment was performed, and the results. In the final section of the 
chapter, the general discussion, we elaborate on the results of our research, 
explore their limitations, and muse in a more broad-minded way about 
the future of experimental jurisprudence.
1. Fuller’s Procedural Natural Law Theory
The key discussion in jurisprudence concerns the necessary and suffi-
cient conditions something must satisfy in order to count as a law or a legal 
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system. Fuller (1969) offered a major contribution to this discussion 
when he proposed a novel set of necessary conditions. Specifically, 
Fuller argued that a social arrangement is a legal system insofar as that 
arrangement satisfies eight principles that he collectively called “the 
inner morality of law.” These principles include the generality principle 
(that legal systems must have general rules of conduct), the publicity 
principle (that legal rules of conduct must be made public for those regu-
lated to learn of their rights and duties), and the prospectivity principle 
(that a legal rule of conduct may only regulate conduct performed after 
the promulgation of said rule of conduct).1 Since its initial formulation 
in the 1960s, Fuller’s theory has been widely discussed and continues to 
enlist new adherents. This is not surprising because the view has certain 
theoretical virtues, virtues one can identify upon reviewing other well-
known views in this debate.
If the key discussion in jurisprudence is the search for necessary and 
sufficient conditions for law, the most notorious debate within that key 
discussion concerns whether a norm has to have particular content in 
order to count as legal norm. Legal philosophers have been especially 
interested in whether a norm’s content has to comport with the strictures 
of morality in order to be a legal norm. If a norm permits or even requires 
those subject to it to perform grossly immoral acts, can that norm be a 
legal norm? That kind of question has long been the hot-button issue in 
jurisprudence. Those who answer in the affirmative are, roughly speaking, 
legal positivists; whereas, those who answer in the negative are, roughly 
speaking, natural law theorists. Legal positivism has a long list of famous 
proponents (e.g., Kelsen, 1967; Hart, 1994; Waluchow, 1994; Austin, 1998; 
Raz, 2009; Shapiro, 2011); while natural law theory has its own list of 
famous proponents (e.g., Finnis, 1980; Dworkin, 1986; King, 1986; Aquinas, 
1994; Murphy, 2011). Fuller set himself apart by straddling the divide 
between the two camps.
Scholars are often drawn to natural law theory because they hold as a 
considered judgment the thought that, prima facie, those subject to a 
law’s provisions have a moral reason to obey it. Or to put this considered 
judgment another way, prima facie, law deserves subjects’ respect. If this 
1 We reproduce the full set of Fullerian principles below and only offer this abbreviated list 
to help fix ideas.
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considered judgment is used as a desideratum for selecting one’s theory 
of law, one will endorse some content restriction as a condition for some 
norm to count as law. On the other hand, scholars are often drawn to 
legal positivism because they hold as a considered judgment the thought 
that some laws are unjust, such as those of the Third Reich, apartheid 
South Africa, and the antebellum American South.
Because, for Fuller, a norm can be law only if it has certain content 
(e.g., it is prospective and not retrospective), his view is often classed as 
a version of natural law theory. However, Fuller’s natural law theory dif-
fers from more familiar versions of natural law theory which claim that 
a norm is a law only if the norm is just (King, 1986; Aquinas, 1994) or 
claim that unjust norms can, at best, be defective instances of law (Finnis, 
1980; Murphy,  2011). Fuller’s conditions only disqualify norms which 
exhibit certain procedural failings from being laws. Thus, for Fuller, many 
unjust norms can be laws, and only some unjust norms would fail to be 
laws. For this reason, commentators often label Fuller’s view an instance 
of procedural natural law theory.
Fuller’s procedural natural law theory might be thought to enjoy 
theoretical virtues of both traditional natural law theory and legal posi-
tivism. Fuller’s view can countenance the considered judgment that 
law, prima facie, deserves subjects’ respect. Given the procedural con-
straints that Fuller sees as necessary features of law, laws minimally 
treat people fairly. Arguably, this feature of law would deserve respect 
and would give subjects some moral reason to comply with law. To illus-
trate the minimal sense in which law treats people fairly on Fuller’s theory, 
consider two of his principles. The publicity principle (that legal rules of 
conduct must be made public for those regulated to learn of their rights 
and duties) and the prospectivity principle (that a legal rule of conduct 
may only regulate conduct performed after the promulgation of said 
rule of conduct) together imply that law necessarily gives subjects fair 
notice of which behavior will elicit adverse state responses. The forego-
ing explains how Fuller can accommodate one of the driving thoughts 
behind traditional natural law theory, but he does not incur that theory’s 
key theoretical cost, denying that there are unjust laws. It is to Fuller’s 
theoretical advantage over other natural lawyers that he can claim 
with legal positivists that some norms are both unjust and legal in the 
fullest sense.
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Before concluding this section on Fuller’s work and its place in 
contemporary jurisprudence, we summarize the eight principles which 
comprise Fuller’s inner morality of law. The principles are as follows. 
(For ease of exposition, n will signify some norm, L will signify law, and 
all claims concern a single jurisdiction.)
Consistency: n1 and n2 are both L only if n1 and n2 are mutually 
consistent.
Enforcement: n is L only if the published version of n accords with 
how n is enforced.
Generality: n is L only if n is a general rule of conduct.
Intelligibility: n is L only if n can be understood by subjects.
Possibility: n is L only if n requires only those acts subjects are 
physically capable of performing.
Prospectivity: n is L only if n regulates only conduct performed 
after the promulgation of n.
Publicity: n is L only if n is publicly announced.
Stability: n is L only if n does not change too frequently.
2. Overview of the Studies
Having outlined our general ambitions and offered a sketch of Fuller’s 
position, we now must explain our experiments. This explanatory task 
is twofold: to chart the specific steps we took and to justify using these 
experiments in appraising Fuller’s procedural natural law theory.
Broadly, our experiments attempt to ascertain the extent to which 
Fuller’s inner morality of law reflects the folk understanding of law. The 
folk understanding of law can be important for assessing Fuller’s theory 
in two different ways, depending on how one understands his effort.
Following Haslanger (2012a, 2012b), philosophical analysis of the kind 
that Fuller and others engage usually proceeds in one of two modes, 
either as conceptual analysis, analysis of what ‘we’ take the analysandum 
to be, or as descriptive analysis, analysis of what the analysandum actu-
ally is, irrespective of how we see it. If Fuller was engaged in conceptual 
analysis, he was trying to characterize ‘our’ concept of law. As such, his 
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theory is, more or less, a prediction of what those who possess the con-
cept of law would say. Therefore, folk intuitions bear directly on whether 
his attempt has been successful. The folk intuitions are the very subject 
of Fullerian claims on this construal. Alternately, insofar as Fuller attempts 
to do descriptive analysis of law, analysis of what law actually is, folk 
intuitions bear indirectly on whether Fuller is right. It is a familiar 
epistemic principle that views requiring a massive error theory, that is, 
views that imply that most people have false beliefs with respect to a given 
proposition, are to be regarded skeptically (Wright, 1994; Jackson, 1998). 
To be fair, this epistemic principle has its detractors (Frances, 2013), but 
generally, philosophers hold that extraordinary evidence is needed to 
overturn widespread, commonsense views. Given that, determining what 
people believe is essential to determining whether the presumption 
against error theories weighs for or against Fuller’s theory.
Whether one understands Fuller’s effort as an instance of conceptual 
analysis or descriptive analysis, experimental data would best bolster his 
account if it demonstrated that the folk widely and reliably agree with his 
principles. This implies that there are two ways that the data could cause 
trouble for the account: Folk support for Fullerian principles might be 
modest or even meager, or folk support for Fullerian principles might 
be unstable. If the data should reveal modest support, his account faces 
problems, whether construed as conceptual or descriptive analysis. If few 
share his view and Fuller is attempting to predict our shared concept of 
law, we may have to reject the account entirely as an inaccurate predic-
tion. If we view the theory as descriptive analysis, the presumption against 
error theories may tell against him. If the data should reveal unstable 
support among the folk—presented in one fashion, Fullerian principles 
garner widespread support; presented another way, they are roundly 
rejected—supporters of Fuller would need to explain away the Fuller-
unfriendly response pattern. Otherwise, some of Fuller’s opponents will 
attempt to explain away the Fuller-friendly response pattern, thereby 
saddling the view with the previous problem, that of modest support.
With the foregoing in mind, we developed three experiments in 
which we probe folk (Studies 1 and 2) and expert (Study 3) concepts of 
the law. Our studies aim to capture the levels of support that Fullerian 
principles garner while also examining two kinds of effects on judgments 
about the nature of law. These effects, of construal level (Trope and 
Liberman, 2010) evaluation mode (Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount, and 
12 Raff Donelson and Ivar R. Hannikainen
Bazerman, 1999), have already been observed in other areas of judgment 
and decision-making. Below, we briefly describe both effects and 
summarize evidence of their impact upon decision-making at large.
2.1 Construal level
The theory of construal level posits that mental representations (e.g., of 
a soccer player scoring a goal) can occur at different construal levels: 
Higher-level construal focuses on the abstract and functional properties 
(e.g., whether it was a winning goal, or a beautiful goal), while lower-
level construal highlights the concrete, sensorimotor, and/or descriptive 
properties (e.g., whether it was a shot or a header, whether it had spin, 
etc.). Psychological distance is closely linked to construal level (Trope and 
Liberman, 2010) because events that are closer to us in some respect, 
whether temporally, spatially, or socially, are construed at lower levels. 
Distant events, by contrast, tend to be construed at higher levels.
Throughout our studies, we investigate whether intuitions about Fuller 
principles are susceptible to effects of construal level—in the contrast 
between (i) hypothetical (higher-level) versus actual (lower-level) laws 
in Studies 1 and 3, and (ii) between the essence of law (higher-level) and 
concrete instances of law (lower-level) in Study 2.
2.2 Evaluation mode
Judgments and decisions can be made in one of two evaluation modes 
(Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount, and Bazerman, 1999): separate evaluation, 
in which a single option or alternative is evaluated, or joint evaluation, in 
which various options are presented and evaluated at once and often by 
comparison to each other.
A wealth of studies has shown that our preferences and judgments can 
vary as a function of evaluation mode—perhaps because judgments in 
separate evaluation depend on more spontaneous impressions and easily 
evaluable features, while in joint evaluation, secondary characteristics 
that are harder to evaluate can be taken into account (see, e.g., Hsee, 1996).
In an oft-cited example, when asked separately, participants offered 
to  pay more for a new dictionary with only 10,000 entries than for a 
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dictionary with 20,000 entries and a torn cover. Then, when asked 
jointly, participants were willing to pay more for the dictionary with more 
entries. Thus, it is sometimes argued that joint evaluation provides the 
opportunity for spontaneous assessments—i.e., assigning more weight 
to the defective cover than to the number of entries—to be checked 
against subjects’ own normative benchmarks—i.e., believing that one 
ought to value the number of entries more than the condition of the 
cover (Bazerman, Gino, Shu, and Tsay, 2011).
In Study 1, we examine whether the folk conception of law varies as 
a  function of evaluation mode. In particular, we test whether the folk 
endorse the procedural natural lawyer’s view—that laws necessarily 
observe Fullerian principles—more in separate or joint evaluation.
3.  General Methods
Our studies were conducted on samples drawn from two populations: 
(1) United States adults (N = 242) with no specific training or knowledge 
of the law, and (2) bar association members (N = 73) with training and 
substantial experience in the legal profession. Complete study materials, 
data and scripts are available at https://osf.io/my2xe/.
3.1 Lay sample
242 participants (39% women; Age: Q1 = 27, Mdn = 31, Q3 = 40) were 
recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk to take part in Studies 1 and 2. 
All participants were US residents with a 90% approval rate and were 
compensated for their participation (at $7.25/hour, based on median 
completion time during pre-testing).
3.2 Law professionals
73 participants (56% women; Age: Q1 = 38, Mdn = 52, Q3 = 63) were 
contacted via state bar associations. All participants were members of 
bar associations, and most (87%) were lawyers. Median years of experi-
ence doing law-related work was 25 (Q1 = “10”; Q3 = “30 or more”).
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4. Study 1: Necessary or Actual? Fullerian  
Principles in Separate and Joint Evaluation
In our first study, we sought to determine the degree of support Fullerian 
principles enjoy among the folk. In particular, we sought to determine 
how likely the folk were to endorse these principles in the manner set 
forth by Fuller, as necessary conditions for something to count as a law. 
We also sought to determine how likely the folk were to endorse these 
principles, if understood as mere contingent truths. Finally, we also 
sought to explore the effect of evaluation mode.
In this and the subsequent studies, we test whether Fullerian principles 
enjoy endorsement at the 2:1 supermajority level. A case can be made 
that “widespread support” is satisfied at any level of support at or above 
a simple majority. For that reason, our choice of 2:1 may appear arbi-
trary. Several considerations recommend this level of support. A bare 
majority is consistent with rife disagreement. If, for instance, 50.1% of 
the folk endorsed Fullerian principles, it would seem premature and 
perhaps even misleading to claim that Fuller’s theory comports with the 
folk conception of law. It may even be premature to posit a univocal folk 
conception of law in the face of such disagreement. At the other extreme, 
requiring unanimity seems unduly onerous and uncharitable to Fuller’s 
view. If all but a small fraction of participants endorse Fullerian prin-
ciples, it would be unreasonable to claim that Fuller’s theory fails to track 
folk intuitions. With both simple majority and unanimity ruled out as 
reasonable options, both the 2:1 and the 3:1 levels recommend them-
selves. The 3:1 level looks particularly attractive because it seems to 
“split the difference” between simple majority and unanimity. However, 
because we predicted that Fullerian principles would not even garner 
support at the 2:1 level, we chose this level as opposed to the more 
demanding 3:1 level.
To continue about our predictions, we predicted that Fullerian prin-
ciples would garner only modest support, falling below the 2:1 level, 
whether the principles were understood as necessary claims or claims 
about the actual world. This skeptical prediction is motivated by general 
skepticism that Fuller’s theory reflects folk intuitions as well as some 
concern that there is a univocal folk conception of law to be tracked. We 
also predicted that the folk would be more likely to endorse Fullerian 
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principles as true of the actual world than as true necessarily. Two 
reasons backed this prediction. First, since necessity entails actuality 
but not vice versa, the necessity claim is the more ambitious. Second, we 
expected that participants’ own experience living in polities that observe 
the rule of law would dispose them to claim that actual legal systems 
often do respect Fullerian principles; however, we also expected partici-
pants to be familiar with political orders—historical, contemporary, and 
even fictional—with little respect for the rule of law, and this familiarity 
would dispose them to reject the idea that Fullerian principles are 
necessary truths.
4.1 Study 1a: Fullerian principles in separate evaluation
In this part of our first study, we ask one group of participants to evaluate 
Fullerian claims as actually true, and another group to evaluate whether 
they are necessarily true.
4.1.1  Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions, Actual or 
Necessary. In the Actual condition, participants read:
In this survey, we will ask you eight questions regarding the law.
Meanwhile, in the Necessary condition, participants read:
Imagine that anthropologists discover a few previously unknown societies 
on Earth, referred to as the Faraway nations. Their inhabitants are Homo 
sapiens like us and, though their customs and traditions are unique, they 
have government and laws much like the rest of nations on Earth. In this 
survey, we are interested in what you suppose Faraway nations are like. 
Specifically, we will ask you eight questions about their laws.
Next, participants were shown pairs of statements for each Fullerian 
principle and were asked to endorse one statement from each of the 
eight pairs. In each pair, one statement was a Fullerian principle, phrased 
either as an empirical claim (“The law as enforced does not differ much 
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from the law as formally announced”) or as a necessary claim (“The law 
as enforced [in Faraway nations] could not differ much from the law as 
formally announced”). The other statement in the pair was the negation 
of the Fullerian principle.
4.1.2  Results
There was substantial variation in endorsement by principle: Some 
principles, like the publicity principle and the possibility principle, 
garnered endorsement by a supermajority; others, such as the consist-
ency principle, fell even below a simple majority view (see Figure 1.1 
and Table 1.1).
To generate an overall measure of support for Fullerian principles, we 




























Figure 1.1  Actuality (x-axis) and necessity (y-axis) judgments for each 
Fuller principle under separate (black) and joint (gray) evaluation.
Note: The solid diagonal line highlights the judgment reversal between conditions. The 
diagonal dashed lines correspond to supermajority disbelief (1:2) and belief (2:1) averaging 
across judgment types.
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with Fullerian views ranged between 46% and 54% in the Actual condition 
(M = 0.50, SD = 0.21), and between 52% and 64% in the Necessary 
condition (M = 0.58, SD = 0.27). One-sample t-tests against the 2:1 
supermajority level revealed that support for Fuller principles fell short 
of a supermajority in both conditions: Actual t(82) = 7.16, p <0.001; 
Necessary t(80) = 2.81, p = 0.006.
Table 1.1  Endorsement of Fuller principles (in descending order) and 
effects (odds ratio and 95% confidence interval) of statement modality, 
evaluation mode, and their interaction derived from mixed-effects logistic 
regression models on agreement.
  Model 1 Model 2
 Weighted prop. Necessity Joint 
Evaluation
Necessity × Joint 
Evaluation
Publicity 0.70 0.89 0.71 0.28 **
[0.65, 0.75] [0.56, 1.43] [0.44, 1.14] [0.11, 0.73]
Possibility 0.68 0.70 0.71 0.30 *
[0.63, 0.73] [0.42, 1.18] [0.42, 1.20] [0.11, 0.88]
Stability 0.57 0.57 * 0.85 0.71
[0.52, 0.63] [0.34, 0.94] [0.51, 1.42] [0.27, 1.87]
Generality 0.57 0.81 0.69 0.46
[0.52, 0.63] [0.51, 1.30] [0.43, 1.10] [0.18, 1.18]
Prospectivity 0.53 1.29 1.01 0.33 *
[0.48, 0.59] [0.83, 1.99] [0.66, 1.57] [0.13, 0.82]
Enforcement 0.49 1.18 1.43 0.59
[0.43, 0.54] [0.77, 1.82] [0.93, 2.21] [0.25, 1.40]
Intelligibility 0.46 1.06 0.96 0.53
[0.41, 0.52] [0.68, 1.65] [0.61, 1.65] [0.22, 1.31]
Consistency 0.29 1.56 # 1.46 0.49
[0.24, 0.34] [0.96, 2.52] [0.90, 2.35] [0.18, 1.30]
Model 1:  0.87 0.94 –
Main effects only  [0.73, 1.05] [0.74, 1.19]  
Model 2:  1.60 ** 1.45 * 0.42 **
+ Necessity × Joint 
interaction
 [1.26, 2.04] [1.05, 2.01] [0.28, 0.62]
Note: #: p < 0.10, *: p < 0.05, **: p < 0.005.
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Surprisingly, agreement with Fuller principles appeared to be higher 
in the Necessary than in the Actual condition—opposite to our original 
prediction. A mixed-effects logistic regression confirmed this result: We 
entered condition as a fixed effect, and participant and principle as random 
effects, while allowing the slope of condition to vary across principles. 
The model revealed a significant effect of condition, OR = 1.55, 95% CI 
[1.04, 2.34], t = 2.21, p = 0.027. In other words, participants were more 
likely to believe that Fuller properties are necessary for law (when 
thinking about hypothetical legal systems) than that they are actual 
properties of laws.
It is unclear why a majority of participants treated Fullerian principles 
as necessarily true with regard to hypothetical laws, but not empirically 
true of the laws they know. First, it could be that participants do not 
fully understand necessity and possibility (◊A→~□~A). Alternatively, by 
appealing to hypothetical laws in one condition and known laws in 
another, perhaps we inadvertently asked participants to report on dis-
tinct concepts (Knobe, Prasada, and Newman, 2013).
If, however, participants view these distinct intuitions as conflicting 
or inconsistent, then the difference in participants’ judgments regarding 
actual versus hypothetical laws ought to vanish (or even reverse) under 
joint evaluation—a hypothesis we pursue in Study 1b.
4.2 Study 1b: Joint evaluation
In this second part of the study, we asked a single group of participants 
to assess whether Fullerian principles actually hold, and whether they 
hold necessarily. We predicted that the surprising result we obtained in 
Study 1a would dissipate when participants make both judgments at 
once. Joint evaluation, we surmised, would help participants to spot the 
seeming inconsistency in claiming that laws obey Fullerian principles by 
necessity though many laws fail to do so in practice.
4.2.1 Procedure
Participants were asked to make both types of judgments (actuality and 
necessity) regarding each Fuller principle. A short introduction to the 
study made this clear.
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4.2.2 Results
Agreement with Fuller principles ranged between 53% and 63% in the 
Actual condition (M = 0.58, SD = 0.24), and between 42% and 54% in 
the Necessary condition (M = 0.48, SD = 0.26), once again significantly 
below supermajority support in one-sample t-tests: Actual t(77) = 3.18, 
p = 0.002; Necessary t(77) = 6.33, p <0.001.
Indeed, prompting participants to evaluate Fuller principles simultan-
eously as empirical and necessary claims reversed the distinction we saw 
under separate evaluation. In a mixed-effects model, the effect of condi-
tion was highly significant, OR = 0.64, 95% CI [0.46, 0.89], z = 3.00, 
p = 0.003. This time, laws were seen as observing Fullerian principles de 
facto (by a simple majority), but not necessarily in a hypothetical legal 
system—as we originally predicted.
Table 1.1 summarizes Fuller principles by endorsement and compares 
the results of Studies 1a and 1b, through additive (Model 1) and interactive 
(Model 2) models with evaluation mode and statement modality as 
fixed effects. The Necessity × Joint Evaluation interaction represents the 
judgment reversal across conditions: Overall, participants were more 
likely to treat Fuller principles as necessarily (but not actually) true 
when judged in isolation, and as actually (but not necessarily) true when 
making both judgments at once.
5. Study 2: The Abstract Essence versus  
Concrete Instances of Law
The previous study focused on attitudes toward Fullerian principles 
when stated in abstract terms. Next, we introduce concrete violations of 
Fullerian principles and ask participants to assess whether they consti-
tute law. By comparing participants’ endorsement of abstract principles 
to their assessments of concrete laws, we aim to conceptually replicate 
the effect of construal level on Fullerian intuitions.
We predicted that the folk would be more likely to endorse Fullerian 
principles when the principles are stated abstractly than when grappling 
with the principles in concrete situations. This prediction is undergirded 
by the thought, expressed by others (e.g. Hart, 1965), that Fuller’s prin-
ciples express reasonable rules-of-thumb to make legislating rational and 
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efficient. As such, it may be hard—when thinking abstractly—to imagine 
how one would engage in lawmaking in any other way. However, if one 
is invited to consider concrete cases of lawmaking that run afoul of the 
Fullerian principles, this difficulty in imagining dissipates, which should 
lead to lower rates of endorsement.
Finally, we also investigate whether judgments on either task, the 
concrete or the abstract, are impacted by the order in which the tasks are 
presented. In our opening study, we found evidence that participants 
treated their judgments at different construal levels as contradictory. 
Specifically, they appeared to ‘correct’ their spontaneous Fullerian 
intuition—that hypothetical laws necessarily observe Fuller principles—
when prompted to consider also whether actual laws in fact observe 
them. Analogously, we might expect that beliefs about the essence of 
law, stated in abstract terms, might depend on whether participants pre-
viously considered specific violations of Fuller principles (i.e., an effect 
of order on judgments in the abstract condition).
5.1  Procedure
In a 2 (construal: abstract, concrete) × 2 (order: abstract-first, concrete-first) 
mixed factorial design, 104 participants were randomly assigned to one 
of two orders. Every participant completed two tasks—an abstract task 
and a concrete task—in a counterbalanced order across participants.
In the abstract section, participants were asked whether laws ‘must’ 
observe a given Fuller principle P or if they ‘can’ violate P, for example:
Can there be laws that contradict one another or must laws be consistent?
The dependent measure in the abstract condition was participants’ 
endorsement of one of two statements:
There can be laws that contradict one another in a single jurisdiction 
(0: non-Fullerian),
or
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There must not be any laws that contradict other laws in a single jurisdiction 
(1: Fullerian).
In the concrete section, participants read about a city ordinance, policy 
proposal, or bill that violated a certain Fuller principle P and were asked 
whether it was ‘truly a law’ or not. For example:
In a hypothetical country, a state legislature passes two bills that the governor 
eagerly signs. The first bill is a speed limit bill. It says that driving along 
Highway 1 at speeds over 80 kilometers per hour is forbidden and that 
anyone found driving at speeds over 80 kilometers per hour on Highway 1 
will be ticketed.
The second bill is a speed minimum bill. It says that driving along 
Highway 1 at speeds under 85 kilometers per hour is forbidden and that 
anyone found driving at speeds under 85 kilometers per hour on Highway 
1 will be ticketed. As a result of the two bills, many tickets are issued and 
the state revenues increase dramatically.
In the above example, we then asked “Are these two bills truly laws?” 
Fullerian judgments (that they are not laws) were coded as 1s, while 
non-Fullerian judgments that they are laws despite violating the consist-
ency principle were coded as 0s.
5.2  Results
As predicted, we observed an effect of construal level, OR = 7.51, 95% 
CI [3.75, 15.03], z = 5.69, p <0.001. Participants were much more likely 
to endorse Fuller principles in the abstract. When stated abstractly, 
participants endorsed Fullerian principles approximately 67%, 95% CI 
[64%, 69%] of the time. When assessing concrete violations of Fuller 
principles, participants largely reported that they were truly laws 
nonetheless, with only 21%, 95% CI [19%, 24%] reporting Fullerian 
judgments.
Unexpectedly, there were no effects of order in either condition, |z| < 1, 
ps > 0.50. Exposure to violations of Fuller principles did not affect beliefs 
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about the inner morality of law, and reflection on the essence of law in 
the abstract did not promote Fullerian reactions to concrete violations 
of procedural principles.
6.  Study 3: The Expertise Defense
So far we have assessed views about the inner morality of law in a sam-
ple of participants who lack technical knowledge of the law. In reac-
tion to past folk psychological evidence, philosophers have sometimes 
argued against drawing any major conclusions from laypeople’s use of 
technical concepts (Sosa,  2007). On this view, evidence of experts’ 
beliefs is needed to understand whether law truly observes Fuller’s 
inner morality of law. In Study 3, we examine whether professionals 
with legal training and experience reveal distinct intuitions about the 
nature of law.
6.1  Procedure
For this study, lawyers were contacted through their bar association 
mailing lists and assigned to one of two conditions, Actual or Hypothetical, 
as in Study 1a. The materials were identical to Study 1a, except we added 
specific questions about participants’ experience in the legal profession 
to the demographic information section.
6.2  Results
Averaging across principles, overall agreement with Fullerian views ranged 
between 39% and 54% in the Actual condition (M = 0.47, SD = 0.22), 
and between 57% and 78% in the Necessary condition (M = 0.67, 
SD  = 0.32). Like lay participants, legal professionals did not tend to 
think that actual laws observe Fuller principles at the 2:1 supermajority 
level, Actual, t(34) = 5.26, p <0.001. However, they did tend to judge that 
hypothetical legal systems would necessarily observe Fuller principles at 
approximately a 2:1 ratio, t(37) = −0.08, p = 0.93.
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Replicating the results of Study 1a, law professionals tended to 
demonstrate the effect of construal level observed in laypeople, OR = 4.05, 
95% CI [1.15, 15.08], z = 2.29, p = 0.022. When thinking about hypo-
thetical legal systems, Fuller principles were viewed as necessary prop-
erties although they were not viewed as properties of actual law.
We then compared the responses of legal professionals to those of lay 
participants. No simple effects of expertise emerged in either modality: 
Professionals were no more likely to judge that Fuller principles are 
actually observed, OR = 0.81, 95% CI [0.33, 1.97], z = −0.51, p = 0.61, 
or  that they are necessarily observed by hypothetical legal systems, 
OR = 1.86, 95% CI [0.84, 4.28], z = 1.57, p = 0.12.
Much like lay respondents, experienced lawyers exhibited the core 
intuition that Fuller’s procedural principles are necessary for law, while 
at the same time believing that laws in practice fail to observe them.
7.  General Discussion
In three studies, we found limited support for Fuller’s (1969) procedural 
natural law theory. As we noted at the outset, in the best case for Fuller, 
we would see widespread and reliable folk endorsement for his principles. 
This is not what we see.
First we consider the widespread front. Though some individual 
principles were widely endorsed by the folk, others were not, and as a set, 
the inner morality of law did not garner 2:1 supermajority level support 
from the folk. Insofar as Fuller aimed to capture ‘our’ concept of law, his 
theory misses the mark at least in part. Because many of his principles 
garner a slim majority support (when construed the right way), worries 
about the presumption against error theories probably do not obtain. 
Thus, if Fuller’s venture is what we called descriptive analysis, he may be 
largely safe. However, as some of his principles did not gain supermajority 
level support (particularly the consistency principle which has 2:1 super-
majority level opposition), perhaps that needs to be modified.
There are larger problems on the reliability front. In conjunction, 
Studies 1a and 1b show that participants’ views about Fullerian principles 
shift depending on the conditions in which they are evaluated. Instability 
of this kind is problematic for Fuller, because, as we argued above, when 
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there are two conflicting reports of the level of endorsement, Fuller’s 
defenders are now saddled with data to explain away. This general 
problem looks particularly worrying given the precise way that results 
turned out, since non-Fullerian reactions look like they emerge in the 
epistemically preferable circumstance, i.e., joint evaluation in Study 1b. 
In joint evaluation, as opposed to separate evaluation, arguably one’s views 
are more likely to reflect one’s more settled opinion. Study 2 looks similar, 
for it shows that when we vary construal levels from high to low, partici-
pants are more likely to doubt Fullerian principles. Again, Fuller is saddled 
with something to explain away; and again, there is room to argue that 
the non-Fullerian response pattern is formed in the more epistemically 
ideal setting. Such an argument might begin by noting that our intuitions 
are sharpest when considering more everyday things.
On closer inspection, our experiments also point toward effects of 
construal level on the propensity toward Fullerian views. When asked to 
reason about the law at a higher construal level, a majority of respond-
ents demonstrated Fullerian intuitions. This was true when participants 
reasoned about hypothetical legal systems instead of actual legal systems 
(Studies 1 and 3), and when they described the abstract essence of law 
instead of concrete instances of law (Study 2).
Taken together, the evidence we presented casts doubt upon the 
notion that we have a stable and univocal concept of law. Rather, our 
evidence suggests that natural law and positivist concepts of law are sup-
ported by thinking at different levels of construal. If so, the philosophical 
debate concerning the role of morality in law may in part arise from the 
psychological capacity to oscillate between two conflicting concepts of 
law (see also Struchiner, Hannikainen, and Almeida, ms.).
Our results also speak to two common objections levied against folk 
psychological evidence on philosophical issues: the expertise defense 
and the reflection defense.
Regarding the former, did experienced legal professionals reveal dif-
ferent intuitions? They did not; legal professionals were also divided 
with regard to the truth of Fuller principles and susceptible to the effect 
of construal level. If anything, under separate evaluation, legal profes-
sionals were somewhat more likely to treat Fuller principles as necessary 
properties of hypothetical laws despite recognizing that the principles 
are flouted by actual legal systems. One may wish to push back at this 
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point by contending that legal professionals are not the relevant sort of 
experts for the expertise defense. On this refurbished version of the 
expertise defense, legal philosophers, not lawyers, are the true experts. 
We do not and need not deny that our attack on the expertise defense 
would be better if we also surveyed legal philosophers. Nevertheless, 
trained lawyers do not have untutored minds about the law, such that 
one can just dismiss their intuitions. These professionals have expertise 
vis-à-vis the folk regarding a wide range of norms that purport to be 
law, and frankly, many trained lawyers have expertise vis-à-vis legal 
philosophers.
Regarding the reflection defense, did conditions favoring more 
careful reflection influence beliefs about the inner morality of law? 
Indeed, our evidence indicated that, when prompted to resolve the ten-
sion between their conflicting intuitions, individuals were more likely 
to conclude that Fuller principles are contingent, not necessary, prop-
erties of law.
However, we must draw attention to important limitations of our 
studies. First, our sample of legal professionals was smaller than one 
would hope. As a consequence, our claims regarding the expert concept 
of law should be treated as provisional and subject to confirmation in 
future research. Second, we did not succeed in eliciting a distinction 
between necessary and contingent truth overall, which may some-
what compromise our conclusions regarding the modality of Fuller 
principles.
We close by re-emphasizing the broad ambition of this chapter. As the 
article actually proceeded, it was largely a piece which offered new reasons 
to doubt Fuller’s procedural natural law theory. As such, one might be 
led to believe mistakenly that the interest of this chapter lies solely in 
point-scoring for particular sides in a narrow debate. One of our broader 
ambitions was to demonstrate that, by using empirical methods, we can 
contribute to core debates in jurisprudence. Thus, this work hopes to 
make a significant methodological point about jurisprudence, that 
experimental methods are viable. We also hope that this chapter provides 
a blueprint to others (to revise and improve!) on gathering information 
about folk intuitions about the nature of law. At present, little such evi-
dence is available (but see, e.g., Tobia, 2018; MacLeod, 2019). Thus, this 
venture and others it inspires will be helpful to many philosophers.
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To see this, we mention just three groups that stand to benefit from 
more experimental jurisprudence projects. There are philosophers of 
law engaged in conceptual analysis of law (e.g., Raz,  2009); for them, 
folk intuitions are the very thing they aim to discover. Experimental 
jurisprudence will provide more reliable access to the truths they seek. 
Other philosophers contend that we have no shared concept of law (e.g., 
L.  Murphy,  2005); for them, access to good data about folk intuitions 
could help to decide that matter. Our data might be suggestive on this 
front, but much more evidence is needed. Still other philosophers argue 
that our task as philosophers of law should include (or even wholly 
comprise) advocating that people accept particular conceptions of law 
for practical reasons (L. Murphy, 2005; Stoljar, 2012; Donelson, in press); 
for them, data about which views already have currency might influence 
the views that these philosophers recommend. These are just some of 
the theorists who stand to gain from more of these projects. We can only 
hope that others will continue in our stead and that this will yield a new, 
experimental jurisprudence.
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